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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

25 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED]
Assistant NIO for East Asia

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SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: East Asia [REDACTED]

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The following items were discussed by the Community Representatives
at the 19 November Warning Meeting. [REDACTED]

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Korea:

1. Analysts spent a considerable amount of time worrying the Kim Dae Jung problem at our recent meeting. Opinion appears to have moved to some degree from the consensus held a month ago. In the light of recent political developments in this country, most analysts now believe that the odds somewhat favor Kim's execution. Several analysts, however, entered the caveat that Chun Doo Hwan had probably not made up his mind on the issue at this point. On the assumption that Kim is indeed executed, nearly all analysts thought it likely that this event would take place before 20 January. Most analysts also believed that Chun, were he to execute Kim, would expect a negative reaction from the new US administration of relative short duration -- that is, one he could with patience ride out. Nearly all analysts felt foreign pressure, particularly from the United States and Japan, would be a factor in the Kim decision, but few were prepared to state that it would be decisive. There was a general consensus that domestic pressures which Chun was likely to take into consideration all pointed toward execution. In short, the analytical group was more pessimistic than it had been in the past, but few were prepared to argue that Kim's execution was a foregone conclusion. [REDACTED]

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2. Analysts examined briefly the anomalous military activity recently observed in North Korea. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Analysts generally thought the situation deserved close watching but was not immediately threatening. [REDACTED]

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The Indochina Situation

3. Sino-Vietnam -- Analysts discussed briefly signs that activity along the Sino-Vietnam border had stepped up somewhat in recent weeks. Indications are that this increased activity has consisted almost exclusively somewhat higher Chinese pressure on the Vietnamese. In general analysts believed that this new activity was related to the fact that the rainy season was coming to an end in Kampuchea, and that the drift of international events was such that the Chinese were likely to conclude that the additional pressure upon Vietnamese would be salutary at the juncture. There was general consensus, however, that Chinese pressure would remain relatively limited and that no "second lesson" was likely at this time. [REDACTED]

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4. Soviet Support for Vietnam -- Analysts examined the question of levels of Soviet military and economic support for Hanoi in some detail. Various scenarios, including a possible Soviet invasion of Poland, were briefly considered. There was a general consensus that Soviet military and economic aid at current levels was such that even in the case of an invasion of Poland, Moscow would have no real difficulty in continuing to underwrite Vietnam. While substantial in Vietnamese terms, Soviet assistance to Hanoi represents only a tiny fraction of the Soviet military and economic output. Analysts pointed out that this support has permitted Hanoi to conduct a policy in Indochina that has substantially advanced Soviet interests -- reenforcing rather than a limiting reason for continuing Soviet assistance. [REDACTED]

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5. The Military Situation in Kampuchea -- Analysts generally agreed that Hanoi's strategy in the coming dry season does not include plans for substantial military actions against Thai's security forces on the Thai-Kampuchean border. No one, of course, was prepared to rule out limited incursions or incidents such as the one that occurred late last spring. Most analysts believed that the Vietnamese could live with the current level of fighting, and that Hanoi probably thought that even with Chinese materiel support the DK was over time a wasting asset to China. They felt that if this indeed was the Vietnamese reasoning, there was no compelling reason to sharply step up Vietnamese activity, or to incur the substantial risks of a major engagement with Thai forces. In short, the consensus was more of the same. [REDACTED]

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Stability in Southeast Asia

6. Analysts briefly considered the domestic situation in both the Philippines and Indonesia and in terms of future stability in those countries. With respect to the Philippines, the issue was whether or not the arrest of Senator Salonga was a significant turn of events that either indicated President Marcos was deeply concerned about the opposition to him or that it presaged increased opposition activities against the regime. After a brief discussion most analysts agreed that Marcos had the situation largely in hand, and that despite his protestations about opposition activity in the US, he himself was reasonably satisfied about his grip on power. The discussion with respect to Indonesia centered on the relationship between leading military elements and President Suharto. In general, analysts concluded that no strains currently existed that would threaten Suharto's position.

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